HDB's success over SIT

The PAP government faced a serious housing shortage when it assumed office in June 1959 because of the failure of the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) to solve the housing problem. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) was established by the PAP government in February 1960 to tackle the housing shortage. Explain why the HDB has succeeded in providing public housing for 84% of the population today when its predecessor, the SIT, had failed to do so. What have you learnt about public administration in Singapore from the HDB’s experience in public housing?


Introduction:

This essay will be organised in two parts; the first being a study of the HDB and their activities, which will then be compared to those of the SIT. The second part will focus on public administration in Singapore and its requirements, with relation to the HDB’s ‘experience’ in providing large-scale public housing.

Public administration in Singapore consists of three main components; the Singapore Civil Service, Statutory Boards and Government-Linked Companies. It must be noted here that the latter two organisations are not part of the structure of the Singapore Civil Service. Statutory boards are task specific and are set up under the supervision of a department of the civil service to tackle certain problems. Statutory boards were set up to complement the Civil Service and provide efficient service while sidestepping the constraints faced by the civil service, yet maintaining accountability.

In this essay, we will be examining one of Singapore most successful statutory boards, the Housing and Development board (HDB), which operates under the offices of the Ministry of National Development. We will also be comparing the HDB to its predecessor, the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), a statutory board set up during the period of British colonial rule in Singapore.


The SIT:
The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) was set up in 1927 by the British colonial government in an attempt to arrest the growing congestion in many parts of Singapore. The main problem areas were in the city centre and Chinatown, spreading rapidly to the East Coast and thus clogging up Geylang road that linked the city to the East Coast. The main aims of the SIT were to reduce congestion, improve and upgrade the existing infrastructure of the country, and especially to widen roads - which were originally built for human and animal traffic, to allow motorcars to pass through .

In 1932 the SIT was given permission to build houses for squatters and other people with no proper housing. The SIT was handed this task as it was seen to have experience in this area due to the fact that it had been previously building houses. The main difficulties faced by the SIT were in relation to a lack of resources to build the houses as well as a lack of legislation that allowed them to carry out these plans, other factors like demographic and political changes also gave the HDB the opportunities it needed to succeed in the face of general disbelief in Singapore’s future. The SIT had been set up as a town planning authority ‘to provide for the improvement of the town and island of Singapore’ ; and was not granted the legal powers of a public housing authority although it was expected to fulfil the role. It was originally meant to provide housing only for those dislocated from their current homes due to SIT improvement schemes. However, due to the growing need for houses, between 1932 and 1941, the SIT was forced to start building some tenement-style housing for those who could not afford private housing; first in Lorong Limau and then Tiong Bahru.

To first cover internal factors leading to the failure of the SIT; the organisation was doing far more than it was meant to do and had to do so without adequate resources. Providing public housing was a top concern for the citizens but not for the colonial government who were more concerned with trade matters. In fact, the main aim for which the SIT was set up – to widen roads, proves how little the colonial government concerned itself with grassroots’ matters, widening roads and improving infrastructure would serve to improve communication links and quicken trade and ultimately improve their profits.

This thirst for profits extended to the structure of the SIT and other government bodies as well. The senior officials would collude with the junior officials (who were often local and fluent in the indigenous tongues) to accept bribes from local contractors and award contracts on that basis. Corruption within the SIT was rife; and this combined with the other internal factors mentioned above made the SIT the resounding failure that it turned out to be. The SIT was staffed by largely expatriates who were often not professionals in the field of public administration, housing or architecture; being employed solely due to their willingness to work in ‘the colonies’. Most of these officers had not been in Singapore for long and were thus unaware of the local situations and unable to adapt; thus being of little use to the needs of the grassroots.

Government expenditure on the SIT was minimal as it was a small concern for the colonial government. The economy of Singapore also contributed to the lacks faced by the SIT; Singapore’s economy was based on entrepôt trade and had significant shortages in terms of skilled labour and capital. As such, with no materials to build, and no one to do the building, the SIT faced major problems getting started on their projects.

External factors also added to their failure, these included the Singaporean demographics, population and politics during that time period. These external factors were beyond the control of the SIT, however, they were badly managed by the SIT, and we will see later, exploited by the HDB for its own success.

Singapore is a very small city-state and this allows for greater governmental control over the administration, and also few communication problems, thus allowing rapid government responsiveness. However, all of these three advantages of Singapore were not utilised by the SIT who were disorganised and rampant with corruption. The climate of Singapore and its natural immunity to natural disasters allows for the building of high-rise flats, but this factor was also ignored by the SIT who built flats up to only four or five stories high. However, the colonial government was not sincere in providing public housing in Singapore and thus cared naught for the structure of the SIT; the costs of building high-rise buildings were also high and thus not a feasible project for the SIT.

In addition to the list of problems faced by the SIT, the rapidly growing population also served to completely unbalance the SIT who seemed to be sinking rapidly. The many squatter settlements that had sprung up all over the island also posed a problem to the SIT as they refused to be evicted and re-housed. The lack of legislative powers to evict them rendered the SIT ineffective. Internally, the SIT already faced problems, these were further aggravated by the external problems they faced; in fact, the SIT was thrown off by the sheer magnitude of the job that had been thrust upon them.


The HDB:

The HDB was far better equipped than the SIT in that the new government had a significant vested interest in ensuring the success of the HDB and its plans. It was set up to avoid the mistakes made by the SIT and was to be awarded “considerably more funds, more legal powers and, above all more drive than its predecessor” . In 32.5 years, the SIT built only 23,264 units; in the 20 years immediately after its creation, the HDB built 372,000 units.

The SIT succeeded where the SIT failed for a number of reasons, these can again be categorised as internal and external reasons, but one common thread running through them was the determination of the new installed PAP party to live up to its election promise of providing adequate public housing for the citizens of Singapore. The PAP put its full political weight behind the HDB knowing that public housing was a volatile issue close to the hearts (and votes) of the people. It implemented a variety of laws that gave the HDB very significant legal leeway. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 eradicated one of the major problems faced by the SIT. The HDB could now take over any plot of land for “for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes” .

The government’s policy of family planning which was implemented by the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board also helped boost the HDB’s amazing success rates by decreasing somewhat the annual rates of population growth and thus alleviating the HDB’s workload.

However, other than the legal rights given to the HDB by the PAP, internal factors also helped the HDB to succeed and raise it to the world-class level it stands at today.
Most importantly, the HDB was set up as the de-jure public housing authority in Singapore, unlike the SIT which had become the de-facto housing authority. The reason behind the creation of the HDB was the creation of ‘low-cost public housing for Singaporeans’ . The external factors did not change much during the handover of the public housing mandate from the SIT to the HDB. In terms of internal factors, the HDB used a great deal of innovation in setting about achieving the aims it had set for itself.

The HDB exploited Singapore’s natural advantages to a significant extent. It set about building high-rise flats, realising that the Singaporean topography favoured such forms of housing. Economically the HDB benefited from Singapore changing from an almost purely entrepôt economy to an entrepôt and manufacturing based economy. This allowed the government to allocate more funds to the HDB, nearly four times the amount spent by the SIT in 12 years was allocated to the HDB for a 15 month period. A most significant reason for the success of the HDB can thus be said to be the provision of adequate funding. This is however not to say that the HDB spent its budget liberally, in its first five year building program, the HDB exceeded its building aims by 3,399 units but spent SGD 2 million less than it had budgeted. This can go to show the commitment of the HDB to serving Singapore well.

The HDB also was pretty self-serving in itself. It’s building efforts contributed very largely to the building boom in the late 1960s and created between 15 to 20 thousand jobs from the 1960s to early 1970s. The provision of adequate funding meant that the HDB did not have to face the problems of the SIT with relation to a lack of capital and building and construction capacity. However, the HDB faced problems in that there was a shortage of skilled labour, building materials, and the increasing inflation meant that costs of building were increasing. The ingenuity with which the HDB overcame these problems proves that the HDB was going to be a huge success and it was. It employed foreign architects and also set up a training scheme in tandem with the Government Ministry it came under to train more qualified architects. Other than this scheme, there were also programs set up to train primary school leavers in the mechanics of the construction industry. Finally, the HDB made attempts to mechanize many of the processes required in building to overcome the shortage of labour and speed up construction. It also began to operate its own granite quarries, piling plants and brick manufacturing factory. These new initiatives ensured that the costs of building were significantly reduced and also somewhat less vulnerable to inflation and other external economic factors. Lastly, the HDB also maintained reserves of some essential building materials to overcome any possible shortages in the future.

Thus, it is apparent that the government loans that were open and offered to the HDB as well as its own initiatives were significant contributing factors to its success.

The changing population of Singapore was also a contributing factor to the success of the HDB. Not only was the population growing at an amazing rate, the sex ratio was also more balanced, this factor and the increase in proportion of Chinese and Malays, together show that Singapore was changing from a city-state where the majority of the population were transient workers to one where the population was settling down. It is precisely due to the ‘settling down’ of the population that the HDB managed to find people willing to first rent, and then buy the units they were building. These people were making an investment in the nation they were beginning to see as home. This is a major point in terms of Singapore’s nation building and how they HDB can serve to unite the majority of the nation. In 1960 a mere 23% lived in public housing, in just ten years it rose to 50% and today, the number stands around 84%. These 84% of people can be said to share common experiences and living standards, thus creating a standard in an otherwise heterogeneous nation.

In terms of the internal factors of the HDB which led to its success, the organisation of the SIT and HDB were significantly different. The HDB carried out recruitment with the aid of the Public Service Commission which fills the offices of the Singapore Civil Service. The system of recruitment is based purely on merit and it is clear from the study done by Jon Quah that the officers of the HDB were not just better trained than those of the SIT, they were far more familiar with the local context and its needs. The morale of the officers in the HDB was also significantly higher than that of the SIT officers, as demonstrated by the reduction in complaints registered against HDB officials , and the reduction in terms of corrupt behaviour among them . Lastly, the internal structure of the HDB was dynamic as opposed to the paternalistic structure of the SIT. This obviously acted as a motivation to its relatively young officials who felt happier working in such a dynamic environment.


Lessons learnt from the HDB on Public Administration in Singapore:

The HDB’s experience has made significant contributions to the study as well as the active practice of public administration in Singapore. Most significantly, I would say that the HDB has set a benchmark not only for statutory boards to follow, but also for all other government bodies.

It has demonstrated in action, the importance of statutory boards, especially in the Singaporean context. In a one-party dominant state, which is immensely multi-racial, it is easy to blame nepotism and other biases for all problems. However, the meritocracy practiced by the HDB in the recruitment of members and in the completely impartial allocation of flats, makes it apparent that the corrupt practices often used by the SIT officials is a thing of the past. The SIT experience has set out the fatal mistakes for any board in Singapore, the mistakes to avoid. The HDB did so successfully. It also demonstrated that the splitting up of work between one or more statutory boards is much more efficient than loading one board with numerous different duties. The SIT had too many things on its plate, this and the lacks in terms of funding and support it suffered from ended up in its dissolution. The HDB concentrated on public housing and in fact some of its duties (urban renewal) were passed on to the Urban Redevelopment Authority in 1974 to allow the HDB greater work specialisation. Even when the HDB was given an extra goal in 1966, that of land reclamation, the coffers of the HDB were increased, as were its other resources. In fact, the success of the HDB has justified statutory boards in themselves. Many sceptics have commented that statutory boards are just an extension of the Civil Service, however the resounding success of the HDB has not just silenced them but stood as a world example in sharing the work of nation building and not loading it all on the Civil Service.

The essentiality of government support in terms of funding, legislation and sheer moral support is also an important lesson learnt from the HDB experience. The SIT failed as drastically as it did largely due to the lack of political support it had from the British government. It is clear from the HDB experience that only when the government and the important government bodies share the same priorities that these aims will be actualised. It is for the benefit of the government to support these bodies as the realisation of campaign and election promises serves the best interests of the party in that it not only legitimises them as a party but also as a ruling government. It was essential for the PAP to maintain their election promise of 1959 and they pushed for adequate public housing, which then became a never-ending process of improvement. This is the main reason for the success of the HDB and Singapore’s public administration, they are never satisfied, and there is always a new level to reach. This is one of the reasons for the PAP government being in power for most of Singapore’s lifespan, post colonial-government.

Other than these factors, the removal of corruption from government systems not just increases the legitimacy of the government but also allows policies to be carried out efficiently and improves rapidly the state of the nation.


Conclusion:
As Such, we can see that the HDB succeeded where the SIT failed for a number of reasons, both internal and external. Strong governmental support is essential for any statutory board and plays the most significant role in the success or failure of the organisation. The internal factors such as recruitment processes and morale also boost the success rate of the organisation.

Singapore has learnt a number of lessons with regards to Public Administration from the HDB experience; these include the importance of government support, the need to cut graft and have impartial systems and the need to only load upon government bodies as much work as they can handle given their resources. If all these lessons are implemented, Singaporean organisations will surpass any expectations and legitimise their setting-up in the first place.


Bibliography:
Hasan, Riaz. Families in flats : a study of low income families in public housing
Singapore: Singapore University Press , c1977.

Housing and Development Board. First decade in public housing, 1960-69.
Singapore: Housing & Development Board, 1970.

Practice of people's participation : seven Asian experiences in housing the poor.
Bangkok : Human Settlements Division, Asian Institute of Technology, 1980.

Quah, Jon S.T. “Statutory Boards.” In Quah, Chan and Seah (eds.), Government and Politics in Singapore, Chapter 6

Quah, Jon S.T. “Public Housing.” In Quah, Chan and Seah (eds.), Government and Politics in Singapore, Chapter 10

Quah, Jon S. T. (Jon Siew Tien), Singapore's experience in public housing: some lessons for other new states. Singapore : Dept. of Political Science, University of Singapore, 1975

Siew, William. Public housing and community development : the Singapore experience. Singapore : MIMAR, 1983.

Urban Planning in Singapore from Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Updated on 6th August, 2005. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_planning_in_Singapore (accessed on 31/8/05)